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 In our federal system of government, state officials are normally 
understood to draw their legitimate authority from affirmative 
grants of power under their state’s constitution. Just as it grants offi-
cial power, however, a state constitution is normally understood to 
limit and condition it as well in ways that conclusively bind state ac-
tors. In Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Board (Bush I)1 and 
Bush v. Gore (Bush II),2 the U.S. Supreme Court unjustifiably de-
parted from this model, a model drawn from salutary principles of 
federalism that play a significant role in the protection of popular 
liberty. 
 State constitutions serve three main functions: they authorize and 
empower the state government to achieve the public good; they grant 
the state power sufficient to resist abuses of national authority by 
the national government; and they control the state power thus 
granted by establishing institutions of governmental self-restraint so 
that the state government does not become an undue threat to its 
own people. Any state constitution thus strikes a balance between 
empowerment and restraint of state government. The way any state 
polity chooses to strike this balance will depend upon its trust in 
government generally and its relative trust of state and national 
power in particular. The U.S. Constitution, however, has virtually 
nothing to say about how a state may strike this balance. Although it 
protects a state’s citizens from their own state government by estab-
lishing a minimal level of individual rights, the U.S. Constitution 
leaves to state polities, through their state constitutions, any deci-
sions about additional structural limitations on state power. 
                                                                                                                    
 * Visiting Professor of Law, State University of New York, University at Buffalo 
School of Law; Professor of Law, Western New England College School of Law. I thank Bob 
Williams for commenting on an earlier draft. 
 1. 531 U.S. 70 (2000) (per curiam). 
 2. 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam). 
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 In the Bush cases, the Supreme Court interpreted Article II, 
Section 1 and the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution to 
create a different system in presidential elections. According to the 
Court in Bush I, a state legislature engaged in the process of select-
ing presidential electors, or determining how they will be selected, is 
free from any constraints that the state constitution might otherwise 
impose on the exercise of legislative power. The Court’s ruling in 
Bush II further invaded state autonomy over the internal structure 
of state government by subjecting Florida’s decision to decentralize 
the administration of statewide elections to what amounts to a fed-
eral nondelegation doctrine for states. These rulings unjustifiably 
disable state constitutions from serving in presidential elections the 
significant, liberty-protective regulatory function they serve on every 
other occasion in which state power is exercised: restraining the or-
gans of state government from abusing important state powers. 
 Part I of this paper briefly discusses the Bush cases. Part II then 
lays out the role that state constitutions normally play in implement-
ing the American structure of federalism, a system the principal goal 
of which is the adequate protection of liberty. Part III turns to 
whether state constitutions should be understood to play a dimin-
ished role in the protection of state liberty during presidential elec-
tions. Although Article II authorizes state legislatures to appoint 
presidential electors,3 I argue, it by no means follows that in so doing 
Article II unmoors state legislatures from the state constitutional re-
straints upon legislative power that attend its use in every other cir-
cumstance. In fact, it is far from unusual for the national Constitu-
tion to grant authority which state constitutions then limit or revoke, 
and there is no reason to suspect a different arrangement here. 
Moreover, if state constitutions do not permit state legislatures to 
exercise legislative power in a way that comports with the require-
ments of Article II, then Article II provides an obvious remedy: ex-
clusion of the state’s electors from the presidential selection process. 
 I argue in Part IV that the Court’s ruling in Bush II, although 
couched in the language of equal protection, responds to similarly 
misplaced concerns about autonomous state decisions regarding the 
internal structure of state government. The Court’s equal protection 
analysis is entirely unsatisfactory. Its main concern is apparently 
with what would ordinarily be characterized as a due process objec-
tion to the vagueness of the “intent of the voter” standard. Vague-
ness, however, is a concern under the Due Process Clause only with 
respect to laws addressed to individuals, not government officials. 
When laws are too vague for government officials reliably to follow, 
the problem is better cast in terms of nondelegation, a separation of 
                                                                                                                    
 3. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.  
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powers doctrine. Yet the U.S. Constitution has nothing to say about 
the way a state chooses to divide power on the state level, including 
its choice not to observe a strict nondelegation doctrine. Moreover, a 
state’s decision to decentralize the administration of elections is also 
a legitimate internal structural decision. To the extent it is based on 
a distrust of state as compared to local power, such a vertical disper-
sion of state power serves as a mechanism by which the state polity 
may protect itself from centralized state abuses of power during 
statewide elections. The Court’s misguided equal protection analysis 
unjustifiably invades this essential area of state autonomy. In reach-
ing these decisions, the Court has acted in a way that strips from the 
presidential election process two important, liberty-protective safe-
guards. 
I.   THE BUSH DECISIONS 
A.   Bush I 
 Article II, Section 1 of the U.S. Constitution provides that presi-
dential electors from each state shall be selected “in such Manner as 
the Legislature thereof may direct.” The Florida Legislature, like 
every other state legislature in the union, has long redelegated that 
responsibility to the people of the state, who elect slates of electors 
pledged to particular candidates.4 The first count of Florida’s popular 
vote in the November 7, 2000, presidential election showed an ex-
ceedingly close result—George Bush led Al Gore by fewer than 1,800 
votes out of nearly six million cast.5 Under Florida law, the closeness 
of the result triggered an automatic machine recount,6 further reduc-
ing Bush’s lead. At the request of Florida Democratic Party officials, 
manual recounts of one percent of the ballots were conducted in sev-
eral counties.7 These recounts further narrowed Bush’s lead, causing 
county officials to determine that “an error in the vote tabulation 
which could affect the outcome of the election”8 had occurred, thus 
warranting full, countywide, manual recounts.9 
 At this point, questions arose concerning the statutory deadline by 
which counties conducting manual recounts had to certify their re-
sults to the Florida Secretary of State for final statewide tabulation.10 
The Secretary of State, relying on an advisory opinion issued by the 
Florida Division of Elections, announced that she would not accept 
                                                                                                                    
 4. FLA. STAT. § 103.011 (2000). 
 5. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1220, 1225 (Fla. 2000), 
vacated sub nom. Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70 (2000). 
 6. FLA. STAT. § 102.141(4) (2000) (amended 2001). 
 7. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d at 1225. 
 8. FLA. STAT. § 102.166(5)(c) (2000) (amended 2001).  
 9. Id. § 102.166(5) (amended 2001). 
 10. See Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d at 1225-26. 
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vote totals submitted later than seven days after the election,11 as 
provided in one section of Florida’s election code.12 Some county 
boards of elections, concerned that the seven-day statutory deadline 
would not provide them with enough time to carry out recounts that 
they were obliged to conduct under other sections of the election code, 
filed suit seeking a reconciliation of their duties.13 Several related 
cases were then consolidated before the Florida Supreme Court, 
which ruled on November 21, 2000.14 
 In its opinion, the Florida Supreme Court interpreted the con-
tested provisions of Florida’s election code.15 It held first that the 
statutory phrase “error in the vote tabulation” includes “a discrep-
ancy between the number of votes determined by a voter tabulation 
system and the number of voters determined by a manual count of a 
sampling of precincts,”16 thus affirming the counties’ decisions to 
conduct full manual recounts.17 It then reconciled several seemingly 
inconsistent provisions of the Florida election code concerning the 
timing of manual recounts,18 holding that the seven-day deadline was 
not a final deadline, and that the Secretary of State must accept 
manual recount totals unless they are so late as to preclude unsuc-
cessful candidates from filing election contests.19 Finally, given the 
lateness of the hour and the tangled course of events, the court in-
voked its equitable powers to fashion a remedy in which the Secre-
tary of State was directed to accept manual recount totals from coun-
ties until November 26, 2000.20 
 In reaching this result, the Florida Supreme Court looked fre-
quently to the Florida Constitution for guidance. 21 The court’s analy-
sis was guided, it held, by a paramount obligation to effectuate the 
state constitutional right to vote of the voters, whom it regarded as 
the real parties in interest.22 In reviewing the applicable law, the 
court listed first two sections of the Florida Constitution dealing with 
elections, including one that authorizes the state legislature to regu-
late elections by law.23 Finally, in construing conflicting electoral 
statutes and settling on a remedy, the court noted that the Florida 
                                                                                                                    
 11. Id. at 1226. 
 12. FLA. STAT. § 102.111(1) (2000) (amended 2001). 
 13. See Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d. at 1226. 
 14. Id. at 1220, 1226. 
 15. Id. at 1220. 
 16. Id. at 1229. 
 17. See id. 
 18. See id. at 1231-39. 
 19. Id. at 1239. 
 20. Id. at 1240. 
 21. See id. 
 22. Id. at 1227-28. 
 23. Id. at 1230 (citing FLA. CONST. art. VI, § 1 (“Registration and election shall . . . be 
regulated by law . . . .”)). 
2001]                          REGULATORY ROLE 629 
 
Constitution prohibits the legislature from regulating elections in 
ways that impose “‘unreasonable or unnecessary’ restraints on the 
right of suffrage.”24 
 Bush appealed this ruling to the U.S. Supreme Court, which, in 
Bush I, vacated the Florida Supreme Court’s ruling and remanded 
for clarification as to the actual basis for the lower court decision.25 
The Court was unsure, it said, “as to the extent to which the Florida 
Supreme Court saw the Florida Constitution as circumscribing the 
legislature’s authority under Art. II, § 1, cl. 2.”26 Although the Court 
technically went no further than identifying this ambiguity, it sug-
gested strongly throughout the opinion that the Florida Supreme 
Court had committed reversible error to the extent it had viewed the 
Florida Constitution as constraining in any way the authority of the 
Florida Legislature under Article II, Section 1 of the U.S. Constitu-
tion.27 The Court quoted dicta from its 1892 decision in McPherson v. 
Blacker,28 suggesting that Article II’s specific grant of authority to 
the “state legislature,” as opposed to the state itself, not only “op-
erat[es] as a limitation upon the State in respect of any attempt to 
circumscribe the legislative power” but also “cannot be held to oper-
ate as a limitation on that power itself.”29 Relying on this dictum, the 
Court went on to observe that the Florida Supreme Court had said 
things in its opinion “that may be read to indicate that it construed 
the Florida Election Code without regard to the extent to which the 
Florida Constitution could, consistent with Art. II, § 1, cl. 2, 
‘circumscribe the legislative power.’”30 The implication of this sen-
tence is clearly that the Florida Constitution may not be so read. 
B.   Bush II 
 Whereas Bush I arose out of the “protest” phase of Florida’s 2000 
presidential election, Bush II arose out of the subsequent “contest” 
phase. Proceeding subject to the Florida Supreme Court’s decision in 
Palm Beach County Canvassing Board v. Harris, the Florida Election 
Canvassing Commission, after receiving various county manual re-
count totals, certified George Bush the winner of Florida’s electoral 
votes by a margin of 537 votes.31 Gore then filed a statutory contest 
proceeding, arguing that votes had been illegally counted in numbers 
                                                                                                                    
 24. Id. at 1236-37 (quoting Treiman v. Malmquist, 342 So. 2d 972, 975 (Fla. 1977)). 
 25. Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70, 78 (2000) (per curiam). 
 26. Id. 
 27. See id. 
 28. 146 U.S. 1 (1892). 
 29. 531 U.S. at 76 (quoting McPherson, 146 U.S. at 25). 
 30. Id. at 77. 
 31. Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243, 1247 (Fla. 2000) (per curiam), rev’d sub nom. 
Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
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sufficient to change the outcome of the election.32 In conducting an 
appellate review of various aspects of the counting of presidential 
votes, the Florida Supreme Court interpreted the state election code 
to require that certain disputed ballots be counted in Gore’s total.33 
In addition, the court ruled that approximately 9,000 additional bal-
lots (the so-called “undercounts”)34 in Miami-Dade County had to be 
recounted manually and the totals included in the final count.35 Fi-
nally, the court held that similarly undercounted ballots throughout 
the state might also need to be manually counted and remanded the 
case for such a determination.36 In conducting any recounts, the court 
held, canvassers should be guided by the statutory standard of at-
tempting to effectuate the “clear . . . intent of the voter.”37 
 On appeal in Bush II, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed.38 After 
noting that the U.S. Constitution grants no one the right to vote for 
presidential electors,39 the Court went on to observe that the Florida 
Legislature’s decision to permit citizens to vote for electors gave rise 
to an obligation under the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Con-
stitution to avoid valuing any individual’s vote arbitrarily over the 
vote of another.40 The Florida Supreme Court’s recount decision, the 
Court held, did not satisfy this obligation because the standard it di-
rected to be applied—the “intent of the voter” standard—was too un-
specific “to ensure its equal application.”41 As a result, the Court said, 
“the standards for accepting or rejecting contested ballots might vary 
not only from county to county but indeed within a single county 
from one recount team to another.”42 This process was “inconsistent 
with the minimum procedures necessary to protect the fundamental 
right of each voter” in the recount process.43 
II.   STATE POWER IN A FEDERAL SYSTEM 
 To get our bearings, it will be useful to review some basic princi-
ples of federalism. Our system of government is founded on two fun-
damental premises that are in considerable tension with one an-
other: first, government is necessary; second, it is dangerous. That 
                                                                                                                    
 32. Id. (relying on FLA. STAT. § 102.168(3)(c) (2000)). 
 33. Id. at 1248. 
 34. Undercounted ballots are those on which a voter attempted to punch a vote for 
President but did so incompletely or in a way that caused the tabulating machine to record 
the ballot as registering no vote for President. 
 35. Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d at 1262.  
 36. Id. 
 37. Id.; see FLA. STAT. § 101.5614(5) (2000) (amended 2001). 
 38. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 110 (2000) (per curiam). 
 39. Id. at 104. 
 40. Id. at 104-05. 
 41. Id. at 106. 
 42. Id.  
 43. Id. at 109. 
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we have a system of government at all shows, of course, that Ameri-
cans have decided that the potential benefits of government outweigh 
the potential risks. If citizens were able to achieve all their goals 
without the application of organized governmental power, presuma-
bly they would attempt to do so without creating and empowering a 
government, with its attendant risk of official tyranny. The fact that 
the American polity has seen fit to create not one but many govern-
ments, much less to endow them with the enormous powers they cur-
rently possess, suggests that organized, collective social power 
wielded by a governmental apparatus is essential to the achievement 
of collective popular goals, whatever they may be. 
 American governments, it thus seems safe to say, require signifi-
cant affirmative powers if they are to achieve the apparently ambi-
tious goals that the people have established for them, and in so doing 
to effectuate the public good as citizens conceive it. That kind of 
power, however, is dangerous, and one of the chief sources of danger 
is the possibility that it may become excessively concentrated and 
centralized. As Madison famously observed, “[t]he accumulation of all 
powers . . . in the same hands . . . may justly be pronounced the very 
definition of tyranny.”44 Federalism, of course, is a method of struc-
turing government power that recognizes the necessity of govern-
ment while attempting to reduce the risk of official tyranny. Federal-
ism protects liberty by giving each level of government, state and 
federal, substantial powers sufficient to allow each to monitor and 
check the abuses of the other. As with the horizontal separation of 
powers, which divides governmental power into legislative, executive, 
and judicial branches, each piece of government in this fragmented 
system is given the power and incentive to struggle against the oth-
ers: “[a]mbition,” as Madison put it, “must be made to counteract 
ambition.”45 The result is a compound federal republic in which 
power is deeply fragmented, reducing as far as possible by structural 
means the likelihood that a tyrannical measure of power can be ac-
cumulated in a single set of hands: 
In a single republic, all the power surrendered by the people, is 
submitted to the administration of a single government; and 
usurpations are guarded against by a division of the government 
into distinct and separate departments. In the compound republic 
of America, the power surrendered by the people, is first divided 
between two distinct governments, and then the portion allotted to 
each, subdivided among distinct and separate departments. Hence 
a double security arises to the rights of the people. The different 
                                                                                                                    
 44. THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 324 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).  
 45. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 349 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). 
632  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:625 
 
governments will controul [sic] each other; at the same time that 
each will be controuled [sic] by itself.46 
 The multiplicity of power centers in the American scheme can 
create the impression that the system is chaotic—a pure, Hobbesian 
war of all against all without any purpose other than the accumula-
tion of power. This is not the case, or at least need not be the case. 
What unifies the dispersion of governmental power, in the Framers’ 
view, is the people, for the entire system is designed to assure as far 
as possible that their wishes will be done and their liberties left in-
tact. “The Federal and State Governments,” Madison observes, “are 
in fact but different agents and trustees of the people, instituted with 
different powers and designated for different purposes.”47 Federalism 
is thus more than a passive institutionalization of political conflict. It 
is a dynamic system that is designed to be manipulated by the people 
to produce results they desire. Hamilton put this point clearly: 
[I]n a confederacy the people, without exaggeration, may be said to 
be entirely the masters of their own fate. Power being almost al-
ways the rival of power; the General Government will at all times 
stand ready to check the usurpations of the state governments; 
and these will have the same disposition towards the General Gov-
ernment. The people, by throwing themselves into either scale, will 
infallibly make it preponderate. If their rights are invaded by ei-
ther, they can make use of the other, as the instrument of re-
dress.48 
Thus, the Framers expressly contemplated that popular allegiances 
to any government would not be fixed organically but would ebb and 
flow according to their instrumental value to the populace at any 
given time. Each level of government would be given sufficient power 
to check any tyrannical tendencies of the other, but when and 
whether to activate this checking power would be up to the people. 
The “double security” of which Madison spoke,49 then, does not arise 
so much from some complicated scheme of complementary powers, as 
is so often supposed, but from a conceptually much simpler arrange-
ment in which the state and national governments independently po-
lice much of the same turf. To protect that turf, the people make use 
                                                                                                                    
 46. Id. at 350-51. 
 47. THE FEDERALIST NO. 46, at 315 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). 
 48. THE FEDERALIST NO. 28, at 179 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). 
See also THE FEDERALIST NO. 46, supra note 47, at 317, in which Madison, after remarking 
that Americans place their faith and trust primarily in their state governments, observes:  
If . . . the people should in future become more partial to the federal than to the 
State governments, the change can only result, from such manifest and irre-
sistible proofs of a better administration, as will overcome all their antecedent 
propensities. And in that case, the people ought not surely to be precluded from 
giving most of their confidence where they may discover it to be most due . . . . 
 49. See supra text accompanying note 46.  
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of whichever level of government is more capable and accommodating 
at any particular moment. 
 This scheme of federalism clearly contemplates that states will 
have significant powers. First, even apart from their functions in 
monitoring the exercise of national power, states will likely need sig-
nificant powers if only to accomplish directly the public good, how-
ever the people of the states may understand it. The powers of the 
national government are impressive, but they are also limited; many 
collective social goals are largely beyond the power of Congress to ef-
fectuate. As we might expect, contemporary state governments pos-
sess significant powers which they can use affirmatively in pursuit of 
the public good. Indeed, the scope of state power tends to be (al-
though it need not be) broader than the scope of national power, 
reaching many areas of ordinary life that the national government is 
usually understood to lack the power to regulate.50 For example, state 
law overwhelmingly provides the controlling substantive rules in the 
laws of tort, contract, commercial transactions, crimes, property, 
wills, and family formation—the areas of law that are most likely to 
affect individuals directly in the most significant aspects of their 
daily lives. 
 Second, it is clear, particularly given the immense power now 
wielded by the national government, that state governments must 
themselves possess considerable power if federalism is to work as in-
tended. States cannot possibly serve as effective counterweights to 
national power if they are too weak to erect effective obstacles to 
abuses of national power. States presently have numerous means at 
their disposal to check abusive exercises of national power. These 
range from illegal or extraconstitutional methods such as secession, 
the threat of force, or peaceful defiance of national law; to quasi-legal 
strategies such as deliberate failure fully to comply with or to enforce 
binding federal law; to fully legal means such as the use of political 
pressure, the exercise of ordinary state power where it is not pre-
empted, refusal of national financial incentives, lawsuits against the 
national government in federal court, and setting higher standards of 
state conduct by granting more generous constitutional or statutory 
rights. All of these means of resistance, however, require the state to 
possess and exercise considerable governmental power. 
 Because state power in a well-functioning federal system must be 
significant, it inevitably presents a real and substantial risk of 
abuse. For this reason, state power must be not only granted for le-
gitimate purposes, but somehow restrained so that it will not be used 
for illegitimate ones. State power may be so restrained in one of two 
                                                                                                                    
 50. See, e.g., Walter F. Dodd, The Function of a State Constitution, 30 POL. SCI. Q. 201 
(1915). 
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ways. Federalism itself furnishes the first method. Just as federalism 
contemplates that state power will be deployed to check abuses of na-
tional power, it also contemplates that national power will be de-
ployed to check abuses of state power. Thus, the national government 
has at its disposal numerous means by which abuses of state power 
may be curbed. These include such familiar mechanisms as preemp-
tion of undesirable state laws; the use of financial incentives to in-
duce states to alter their laws or practices; protection of individual 
rights through application of the national Bill of Rights and the 
Fourteenth Amendment; and federal judicial review of the constitu-
tionality of state laws. In addition, the national government may 
back these practices with the implicit (or sometimes explicit) threat 
of force. 
 It is at least conceivable that some state polity might think that 
the methods of restraint available to the national government 
amount to a set of external safeguards entirely sufficient to prevent a 
state from using its powers tyrannically against its own citizens, and 
consequently that no additional, internal measures were needed. In 
practice, however, no state polity has ever been willing to trust its 
freedom from state tyranny entirely to the national government. On 
the contrary, the citizenry of every state has thought it necessary to 
create internal safeguards, implemented by means of a state consti-
tution, which deploy state power against itself to institutionalize a 
form of state self-restraint. The most common means of internally re-
straining state government include partially disabling it by dividing 
power horizontally, vertically or in both ways; creating a state bill of 
rights; and establishing state judicial review as an enforcement 
mechanism. 
 States, then, must possess significant power both to achieve the 
public good directly and to monitor and check abusive exercises of 
national power; yet the granting of such power poses risks to liberty 
that require state power to be hobbled by institutions of internal self-
restraint. This tension imposes upon state constitutions a structural 
trade-off whose parameters are defined by the effectiveness of state 
power, on one hand, and the effectiveness of limitations on those 
powers, on the other. At one end of the spectrum, a state polity might 
create an extremely potent state government enjoying ample author-
ity to impede national tyranny and facing few internal impediments 
to the effective exercise of those powers. Such a state government 
would be capable of protecting the liberty of its people vigorously 
against invasion by the national government, but only at the cost of 
leaving its citizens relatively vulnerable to invasions of liberty by the 
state itself. At the other end of the spectrum, a state polity might 
create a state government enjoying relatively few powers or facing 
significant internal self-restraints that impair its ability effectively to 
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exercise granted powers. Such a state government, because it would 
be weak, would pose few direct threats to the liberty of the state’s 
citizens. It would, however, leave them relatively vulnerable to inva-
sions of their liberty originating at the national level. There is no 
limit to the number of different ways in which a state polity may 
choose to strike a balance between state empowerment and restraint, 
and between state and national power. Under federalism, however, 
the exact nature of that balance is decidedly for the people of each 
state to determine. 
 Although any number of factors may influence the way in which a 
state polity chooses to balance these considerations, it seems certain 
that one extremely important factor will be the particular patterns of 
distrust of governmental power that prevail among the people of the 
state. American constitutional theory rests on the bedrock proposi-
tion that no government is entitled to the people’s complete trust and 
faith.51 Yet it does not follow that all governments are to be dis-
trusted equally. There are numerous reasons why a state polity 
might be less willing to trust one level of government than the other. 
Size alone, for example, may affect political dynamics in different 
ways on the state and national levels. As Madison argued in The 
Federalist No. 10, state political processes may well be more suscep-
tible to a destructive, factional politics of self-interest than are na-
tional political processes simply because states are smaller, and con-
tain fewer people, than the nation.52 State governments, on the other 
hand, are often said to be more responsive to public opinion than the 
national government, which might make them more rather than less 
trustworthy. Another factor that might affect the trust the people of 
a state feel for the national and state governments concerns the rela-
tive competencies of each. Not every government has the power, re-
sources or incentives to do every job equally well. Finally, a state pol-
ity might feel different degrees of trust for the state and national 
governments as the result of its actual historical experience of life 
under both.53 This is not a factor amenable to structural analysis, but 
rather a contingent matter that depends entirely upon the particular 
actions each level of government may have taken in the past, the ef-
fects of those actions on the state’s citizens, and the ways in which 
the citizenry has chosen to interpret those actions. If the people of 
                                                                                                                    
 51. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 45, at 349:  
If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to gov-
ern men, neither external nor internal controuls [sic] on government would be 
necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered by men over 
men, the great difficulty lies in this: You must first enable the government to 
controul [sic] the governed; and in the next place oblige it to controul [sic] itself. 
 52. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 63-64 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). 
 53. See, e.g., C. VANN WOODWARD, THE BURDEN OF SOUTHERN HISTORY 17-21 (rev. ed. 
1960). 
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the state feel that the national government has, on the whole, 
treated them better than the state government, they may be more in-
clined to trust national power than state power, and vice versa. 
 Whatever the choices made by a state polity, it is clear that a 
critical function of a state constitution is to embody and institutional-
ize those choices through the establishment, empowerment, and re-
straint of concrete institutions of state governance. A state constitu-
tion, then, is neither a piece of legal decoration nor some kind of op-
tional add-on that state polities may choose to create for purposes 
that are of no concern to the national polity or its government. On 
the contrary, state constitutions are critical tools in operationalizing 
and institutionalizing the principles of federalism. They are an in-
dispensable component of a system that must function effectively at 
every level if liberty is to be protected adequately at any level. 
 Normally, the U.S. Constitution is understood to have little influ-
ence over these state decisions: it treats the protection of a state’s 
citizens from their own state government largely as a matter of in-
ternal state self-governance.54 Thus, how much power state govern-
ments are to possess, how that power is to be structured and divided, 
and what rights citizens are to hold against state governments are 
all questions for the people of each state to answer for themselves. 
The national Constitution does, to be sure, contain some mechanisms 
that protect citizens from state tyranny.55 It establishes, for example, 
a minimal level of protection for individual rights which states are 
obliged to respect.56 The Constitution also provides the national gov-
ernment with certain tools for intervening to relieve state citizens 
from the burdens of abusive state actions, preemption, financial in-
ducements, and judicial review of state laws, for example. But these 
protections are quite limited. Congress can hardly monitor every law 
                                                                                                                    
 54. See, e.g., Dreyer v. Illinois, 187 U.S. 71, 83-84 (1902). 
A local statute investing a collection of persons not of the judicial department, 
with powers that are judicial and authorizing them to exercise the pardoning 
power which alone belongs to the Governor of the State, presents no question 
under the Constitution of the United States. The right to the due process of law 
prescribed by the Fourteenth Amendment would not be infringed by a local 
statute of that character. Whether the legislative, executive and judicial powers 
of a state shall be kept altogether distinct and separate, or whether persons or 
collections of persons belong to one department may, in respect to some mat-
ters, exert powers which, strictly speaking, pertain to another department of 
government, is for the determination of the State. 
Id.; see also Mayor of Philadelphia v. Educ. Equality League, 415 U.S. 605, 615 n.13 (1974) 
(“The Constitution does not impose on the States any particular plan for the distribution of 
governmental powers.”). 
 55. This occurs by operation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s “incorporation doctrine.” 
 56. See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 
U.S. 479 (1965); Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 
319 (1937). 
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enacted in every state,57 and the protections furnished by the na-
tional Bill of Rights, though hardly inconsiderable, have never been 
thought to represent the last word on the relationship between indi-
viduals and the state. 
 If the U.S. Constitution provides some protection against state 
tyranny by establishing baseline levels of individual rights and by 
authorizing external intervention by the national government, it 
provides virtually (and perhaps literally) no such protection when it 
comes to the question of how state power ought to be structured and 
deployed—a question long understood in our system of constitutional 
government to be critical to the protection of liberty.58 Here, state 
polities are left almost entirely to their own devices. A few provisions 
of the U.S. Constitution, by referring to a state legislature, state 
executive or state judiciary, clearly presuppose the existence of a 
state government divided into three branches.59 Whether they require 
such a division is altogether a different question, and is in any event 
beside the point. Even if the U.S. Constitution requires state 
constitutions to establish three distinct government branches, it says 
nothing at all about what powers the branches ought to possess and 
how those powers ought to be distributed among them, leaving it 
silent on the one issue that actually counts in determining whether a 
system of constitutional separation of powers will protect liberty 
adequately and permanently.60 
 The only provision of the U.S. Constitution that might plausibly 
be thought to establish specific, liberty-protective requirements relat-
ing to the internal structure of state government is the Guarantee 
Clause, which requires the United States to “guarantee to every 
State in this Union a Republican Form of Government.”61 The mean-
                                                                                                                    
 57. The Court’s Dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence recognizes this reality in 
the economic realm. 
 58. The original U.S. Constitution, after all, did not contain a Bill of Rights; the 
Framers apparently believed that structural protections were the most important means 
for protecting liberty. 
 59. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1 (voters for Representative “shall have the 
Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State Legisla-
ture”); id. art. I, § 2, cl. 4 (vacancies in House to be filled by writs of election issued by 
state’s “Executive Authority”); id. art. I, § 3, cl. 1 (Senators from each state to be chosen by 
“the Legislature thereof ” ); id. art. II, § 1, cl. 2 (presidential electors to be appointed in each 
state “in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct”); id. art. VI, cl. 2 (“the Judges 
in every State shall be bound” by the U.S. Constitution). For a more detailed discussion, 
see Michael C. Dorf, The Relevance of Federal Norms for State Separation of Powers, 4 
ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 51 (1998). 
 60. See THE FEDERALIST NOS. 47, 48 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). 
 61. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. Another provision, Article I, Section 10, Clause 1, prohib-
its states from granting any “Title of Nobility,” which might be construed to forbid a mon-
archical or aristocratic form of government. I ignore it here because its applicability seems 
extremely limited and too remote from contemporary considerations of governmental 
structure. 
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ing of the Clause is obscure, however, because it has been neither au-
thoritatively construed nor judicially enforced: the Supreme Court 
has consistently held that questions arising under the Guarantee 
Clause raise nonjusticiable political questions.62 Even if the Clause 
were enforceable, however, there are good reasons to think that it 
imposes structural requirements so minimal as to provide no mean-
ingful constraints on a state’s ability to structure state government 
in whatever way the people of the state think best protects them 
from state tyranny. According to Madison, all that is required for a 
government to qualify as republican is that its officers be elected, 
even indirectly, by the people.63 The U.S. Supreme Court, moreover, 
has held that the Guarantee Clause was not intended to call into 
question any form of state government existing in 1787.64 Given that 
Rhode Island and Connecticut then operated under their original 
royal charters, and that the rights to vote and to hold office were se-
verely restricted in many states, it is difficult to imagine even a vig-
orously enforced Guarantee Clause requiring much of state govern-
mental structure. 
 State polities, then, are generally quite free to experiment in their 
state constitutions by tailoring internal structures of self-governance 
to their particular tastes and notions about how liberty is best to be 
protected. This freedom has been frequently exercised, and in ways 
that often seem to reflect popular determinations about the trustwor-
thiness or untrustworthiness of state as compared to national power. 
For example, many state constitutions seem to reflect a popular trust 
in state power by granting state governments far greater power than 
the U.S. Constitution grants the national government, and often giv-
ing it to them in more concentrated, and thus potentially more dan-
gerous, forms. Thus, unlike the U.S. Constitution, which enumerates 
government powers, state constitutions tend to grant power to each 
branch of state government in one immense, undifferentiated and 
unlimited block. Some state constitutions, moreover, authorize a 
much more relaxed separation of powers than does the U.S. Consti-
tution. For example, the Rhode Island Constitution permits state leg-
islators to appoint members of executive branch agencies, including 
                                                                                                                    
 62. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 208-10 (1962); Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 
549, 556 (1946); Pacific States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118, 150-51 (1912); Lu-
ther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 47 (1849). But see New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 
144, 183-85 (1992) (noting disagreement as to the scope of nonjusticiability under the 
Guarantee Clause and concluding that the question need not be resolved in the case at 
hand); Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 175-76 (1874) (refusing to recognize 
suffrage rights for women under the Guarantee Clause). 
 63. THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, at 251 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). The 
original U.S. Constitution used indirect election for Senators, the President, and the Vice 
President. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3; id. art. II, § 1. 
 64. Minor, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) at 175-78. 
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self-appointment65—forms of cross-branch appointments forbidden 
under the U.S. Constitution.66 Several state constitutions permit the 
state legislature to exercise a legislative veto over regulations prom-
ulgated by state executive departments,67 a device that violates the 
constitutional separation of powers laid out for the national govern-
ment.68 
 In other cases, state constitutions impose constraints on state 
governments that have no counterpart on the national level, suggest-
ing heightened popular distrust of state power. For example, many 
state constitutions divide and disperse state power in ways that the 
U.S. Constitution does not. Such measures include a highly splin-
tered executive branch in which executive power is divided among 
multiple officials, each independently elected,69 and a stricter hori-
zontal separation of powers among branches of state government, 
such as a vigorous nondelegation requirement.70 Many state constitu-
tions restrict the exercise of state legislative power to a much greater 
degree than the U.S. Constitution restricts congressional power by 
imposing limitations on taxation and spending, as well as a host of 
technical requirements such as the single-subject rule or restrictions 
on special or local legislation.71 A number of state constitutions re-
veal a deep distrust of state government by creating numerous 
mechanisms of direct popular control such as referendums, initia-
tives, recall, and rotation in office.72 
 If states are free to experiment to this degree, it is difficult to see 
anything in the U.S. Constitution that might prevent them from go-
ing even further afield from the standard, national model of govern-
mental structure. The parliamentary system of government, for ex-
ample, is the world’s most popular structural form of democratic gov-
ernment. If a state wanted to adopt such a system, it is hard to imag-
ine what provision of the U.S. Constitution might bar it from doing 
so. Only the extremely unlikely prospect of a radical expansion of no-
                                                                                                                    
 65. In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor (Rhode Island Ethics Commission—
Separation of Powers), 732 A.2d 55 (R.I. 1999). 
 66. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2; Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 120-24 (1976). 
 67. See, e.g., CONN. CONST. art. II; IOWA CONST. art. III, § 40; NEV. CONST. art. III, § 
1(2)(c); N.J. CONST. § art. V, & 6; Mead v. Arnell, 791 P.2d 410 (Idaho 1990). For a discus-
sion, see Jim Rossi, Institutional Design and the Lingering Legacy of Antifederalist Separa-
tion of Powers Ideals in the States, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1167, 1212-16 (1999). 
 68. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 941-43 (1983). 
 69. See 32 THE BOOK OF THE STATES 33-34 (1998). Regarding Florida in particular, 
see Deborah K. Kearney, The Florida Cabinet in the Age of Aquarius, 52 FLA. L. REV. 425 
(2000). 
 70. See Rossi, supra note 67, at 1193-1201. 
 71. ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 796-823, 917-93 (3d ed. 1999). 
 72. See James A. Gardner, Devolution and the Paradox of Democratic Unresponsive-
ness, 40 S. TEX. L. REV. 759, 766-67 (1999). 
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tions of due process73 could, it seems, derail such a state decision con-
cerning the details of its constitutional structure of internal self-
governance. 
 If the picture I have painted of state autonomy over internal gov-
ernment structure is correct, the question raised by the Bush cases is 
this: are things any different during presidential elections merely be-
cause Article II gives state legislatures a role to play in the selection 
of presidential electors? The answer, I suggest, is no. 
III.   STATE CONSTITUTIONS AND THE SELECTION 
OF PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORS 
 For the reasons I have described, state constitutional restraints 
on the powers of state legislatures represent sober, potentially valu-
able, liberty-protective measures that may impair a legislature’s abil-
ity successfully to abuse its often considerable powers. Article II, 
Section 1 of the U.S. Constitution grants state legislatures a power 
that their own state constitutions do not and could not grant: it spe-
cifically authorizes state legislatures to select presidential electors, 
or to determine the manner in which they shall be selected. Like any 
other power granted to a state legislature, this one is susceptible of 
abuse. 
 Madison’s theory of self-aggrandizement assumes that legisla-
tures will habitually act so as to increase their own powers at the ex-
pense of other political actors,74 but this need not always be the case. 
History furnishes numerous examples of representative bodies vol-
untarily turning over power to tyrants of varying sorts. The Athenian 
Assembly relinquished all its power to the Four Hundred.75 The Ro-
man Senate on several occasions turned over its power to a single 
dictator.76 In our time, the German Reichstag voted in 1933 to turn 
over all legislative power to an executive cabinet led by Hitler.77 
There is no reason to suppose that American state legislatures are 
                                                                                                                    
 73. That is, the Court might have to find some kind of individual due process right to 
be subject only to laws made by a three-branch government whose powers are balanced in 
a way sufficiently close to the balance established by the U.S. Constitution. The theory for 
such a holding would be that only this arrangement, and no other, adequately protects 
personal liberty. Before the Bush decisions, I would have found this prospect laughable. 
Now I am not so sure. 
 74. THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, at 333 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) (“The 
legislative department is every where extending the sphere of its activity, and drawing all 
power into its impetuous vortex.”); see also THE FEDERALIST NOS. 10, 47, 51 (James Madi-
son). 
 75, THUCYDIDES, THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR 525-26 (Rex Warner trans., Penguin 
Books 1954). 
 76. See LIVY, THE EARLY HISTORY OF ROME 124-25, 137-38, 213 (Aubrey de Selincourt 
trans., Penguin Books 1960). 
 77. WILLIAM L. SHIRER, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE THIRD REICH: A HISTORY OF NAZI 
GERMANY 198-99 (1960). 
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somehow immune from the temptations that have led other legisla-
tures to support tyrants.78 
 It is far more likely, of course, that any abuse of the power to 
choose presidential electors would be less dramatic. Legislators 
might, for example, barter away their votes for political favors or 
even for cash. This is not an idle possibility. Before the ratification of 
the Seventeenth Amendment, when U.S. Senators were selected by 
state legislatures, bribery of state legislators by senatorial candi-
dates was a widespread problem. In 1899, for example, one candidate 
for Senator handed out over $140,000 of his own money to state legis-
lators in exchange for votes.79 
 Much is at stake in presidential elections. The office of President 
has attained a kind of preeminence that the Framers did not foresee 
and might well have thought undesirably reminiscent of the kingly 
authority they overthrew. Yet nothing in Article II itself sets any lim-
its on the ways in which state legislatures may select electors. If that 
process is to be conducted and disciplined by law, that law must, it 
seems, be supplied by state constitutions. 
 There is little reason, moreover, to think that the people of any 
state would be particularly inclined to trust their state legislature to 
perform the critical task of selecting presidential electors completely 
free of popular guidance and constraints applied by constitutional 
means. First, there is a long American history of popular distrust of 
state legislatures and of corresponding efforts to use state constitu-
tions to curb undesirable legislative behavior. A striking number of 
typical state constitutional provisions represent deliberate public re-
sponses to specific acts of state governmental malfeasance. For ex-
ample, many state constitutions sharply restrict the state’s ability to 
incur debt.80 These restrictions date mostly from the middle third of 
the nineteenth century and were adopted in response to a series of 
disastrous public works expenditures on canals and railroads that 
caused serious financial difficulty for numerous states.81 Many state 
constitutions require that the title of a bill accurately reflect its sub-
                                                                                                                    
 78. The Framers clearly believed that a national legislature could not be trusted to 
resist such temptations. During debates at the 1787 convention concerning presidential se-
lection, a proposal was rejected that would have permitted Congress to select the Presi-
dent. On several occasions, a concern was expressed that foreign nations would intrigue 
with members of Congress to corrupt the selection process, shaping it to their malevolent 
whims. See 4 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 536-50 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner 
eds., 1987). 
 79. C.H. HOEBEKE, THE ROAD TO MASS DEMOCRACY: ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE 
SEVENTEENTH AMENDMENT 91 (1995); see also Jay S. Bybee, Ulysses at the Mast: Democ-
racy, Federalism, and the Sirens’ Song of the Seventeenth Amendment, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 
500, 538-41 (1997). 
 80. Stewart E. Sterk & Elizabeth S. Goldman, Controlling Legislative Shortsighted-
ness: The Effectiveness of Constitutional Debt Limitations, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 1301, 1305.   
 81. Id. at 1306-10. 
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ject. These provisions grew out of the infamous Yazoo scandal of 
1795, in which the Georgia state legislature enacted a law whose in-
nocuous title did not accurately reflect the fact that the law’s main 
purpose was to sell public lands to private speculators at an uncon-
scionably low price.82 
 Second, popular distrust of state legislative power has typically 
been strongest in matters relating to the selection of government of-
ficials, a phenomenon reflected in an American electoral history of 
almost continuous democratization. The United States may have 
been founded by republicans, but it was soon inherited by populists.83 
The common current of American populist ideology in its various in-
carnations holds that the people are at least the equal of their repre-
sentatives in respect of their competence to assess and to choose 
among competing public policies. However, populism holds unequivo-
cally that the people are decidedly superior to their representatives 
in their innate virtue.84 American populist movements, from the 
Jacksonians through the Progressives, have thus tended to see 
American politics as a ceaseless struggle by a virtuous and compe-
tent citizenry to prevent its will from being obstructed by corrupt of-
ficials or unsuitable governmental structures and institutions. 
 As a result, populists have turned frequently to constitutional 
amendment, most often at the state level, to strengthen popular con-
trol over what they understand to be unreliable government agents. 
This trend reached its height during the Progressive movement, 
whose leading historian described its purpose as opposing “the con-
trol of government by special interests and the prostitution of gov-
ernment to serve the needs of a small minority.”85 Progressives 
fought this domination by waging largely successful campaigns for 
reforms such as expanded suffrage, secret ballots, direct primaries, 
initiatives, referenda, recall, campaign finance disclosure, and easier 
constitutional amendment, among others, many of which were even-
tually implemented.86 The purpose of these reforms was, according to 
the Progressives themselves, “to dissolve the unholy alliance between 
corrupt business and corrupt politics”87 by giving “a majority of the 
                                                                                                                    
 82. Millard H. Ruud, No Law Shall Embrace More Than One Subject, 42 MINN. L. 
REV. 389, 391-92 (1958). 
 83. Rossi, supra note 67, at 1171-74.  
 84. See James A. Gardner, Madison’s Hope: Virtue, Self-Interest, and the Design of 
Electoral Systems, 86 IOWA L. REV. 87, 130-36 (2000). 
 85. BENJAMIN PARKE DE WITT, THE PROGRESSIVE MOVEMENT 46 (Richard T. Ely ed., 
1915). 
 86. See, e.g., id. chs. 10-11; WILLIAM ALLEN WHITE, THE OLD ORDER CHANGETH 
(1910), reprinted in THE PROGRESSIVE MOVEMENT, 1900-1915, at 133-136 (Richard Hof-
stadter ed., 1963); THE PROGRESSIVE PARTY PLATFORM OF 1912, reprinted in id. at 129. See 
generally John Dinan, Framing a “People’s Government”: State Constitution-Making in the 
Progressive Era, 30 RUTGERS L.J. 933 (1999). 
 87. THE PROGRESSIVE PARTY PLATFORM OF 1912, supra note 86, at 128. 
2001]                          REGULATORY ROLE 643 
 
people . . . an easy, direct, and certain control over their govern-
ment.”88 
 There are good reasons, then, to think that state constitutional re-
straints could serve a potentially valuable, liberty-protective function 
by regulating state processes of elector selection. There are also good 
reasons to think that state polities are likely to value highly their 
ability to impose such constraints on what would otherwise be unre-
stricted state legislative power. Conversely, and contrary to the Su-
preme Court’s intimations in Bush I, there is no good reason to think 
that Article II impairs the ability of state polities to use state consti-
tutions for just this purpose. 
 Our theory of government is positivist. It holds that the organs of 
any government owe their existence, their legitimacy, and their pow-
ers to some founding act of popular sovereignty, the terms of which 
are usually embodied in a constitution.89 This theory is generally 
thought to apply as much to state governments as to the national 
government.90 The American system of federalism, to be sure, blurs 
some of the distinctions between state and national sovereignty by 
constituting a system of overlapping authority, and by making state 
power subordinate in some respects to national power. It does not, 
however, go so far as to undermine the positivist premise that state 
governments are created, and their powers granted and restrained, 
by state polities in state constitutions rather than by the national 
polity in the U.S. Constitution. 
 The Supreme Court’s decision in Bush I suggests that these oth-
erwise valid principles do not apply to state legislative power during 
presidential elections because the power to select presidential elec-
tors is one granted to state legislatures directly and exclusively by 
the somewhat unusual provisions of Article II of the U.S. Constitu-
tion. A power granted to an organ of state government by the na-
tional Constitution, the Court apparently believes, cannot be modi-
fied by a mere state constitution, which is by definition subordinate. 
Yet the interplay between national and state constitutional authority 
under Article II is neither as unique, nor as straightforwardly hier-
archical, as the Court assumes. In fact, the national Constitution 
                                                                                                                    
 88. DE WITT, supra note 85, at 196. 
 89. This foundational proposition runs through the canonical texts of American politi-
cal theory such as the Declaration of Independence, the preamble of the U.S. Constitution, 
and McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819). 
 90. See Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. 122, 193 (1819) (“[I]t was neither necessary 
nor proper to define [in the U.S. Constitution] the powers retained by the States. These 
powers proceed, not from the people of America, but from the people of the several 
States.”). For more general discussions, see James A. Gardner, Federalism and the Prob-
lem of Political Subcommunities, in TO PROMOTE THE GENERAL WELFARE: A 
COMMUNITARIAN LEGAL READER 271, 282-83 (David E. Carney ed., 1999); G. ALAN TARR, 
UNDERSTANDING STATE CONSTITUTIONS 69-70 (1998). 
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routinely grants power to the organs of state government in many 
situations in which no one seems to question the authority of state 
constitutions to guide and limit the ways that state governmental ac-
tors may exercise the granted authority. 
 For example, the U.S. Supreme Court frequently rules that par-
ticular state or national laws do not violate any provision of the Bill 
of Rights or Fourteenth Amendment. Each such ruling authorizes 
every legislature in the land to enact laws identical to the one up-
held, free of national constitutional interference. Yet such rulings 
have never been understood to insulate state legislatures from re-
strictions and conditions on the exercise of legislative power imposed 
by state constitutions. The fact that the U.S. Constitution permits a 
state legislature to enact a law by no means frees the legislature 
from the host of prohibitions and restrictions, whether substantive or 
procedural, that state constitutions often impose. Indeed, the U.S. 
Supreme Court itself has often observed that state polities are free to 
bind state legislatures to more demanding constitutional standards 
for observing individual rights than the national Constitution re-
quires of them.91 
 Similarly, the U.S. Constitution authorizes Congress to use its 
spending power to provide financial inducements to states to take ac-
tions that Congress desires.92 A necessary corollary of the Constitu-
tion’s authorization to Congress to dangle financial inducements be-
fore state governments is the complementary authorization to state 
governments both to comply with congressionally imposed conditions 
and to accept the money. Yet no one, I take it, would dispute the au-
thority of state constitutions to limit, condition, or even countermand 
this nationally granted authority to take actions necessary to receive 
national funds.93 If a state constitution bars the legislature from en-
acting the federally required law, or subjects the collection or use of 
state revenues to budgetary or appropriations requirements, or im-
poses upon the state legislature procedural limitations that prevent 
it from accepting the offered gift, surely these limitations are not dis-
placed simply because the national Constitution has attempted to 
create some new form of state legislative authority. 
 It might be objected that the kinds of national authorization just 
described are indirect, whereas Article II consists of a direct grant of 
                                                                                                                    
 91. The most prominent such case is PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 
74 (1980). The most influential statement of this principle by a sitting Justice, however, is 
Justice Brennan’s 1977 article, William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protec-
tion of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977). 
 92. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987). 
 93. See North Carolina ex rel. Morrow v. Califano, 445 F. Supp. 532 (E.D.N.C. 1977) 
(three-judge court); William Van Alstyne, “Thirty Pieces of Silver” for the Rights of Your 
People: Irresistible Offers Reconsidered as a Matter of State Constitutional Law, 16 HARV. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 303 (1993). 
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state legislative authority. Yet the U.S. Constitution also grants au-
thority directly to organs of state government in circumstances 
where state constitutions routinely limit or modify it. For example, 
the U.S. Constitution directly authorizes state courts to hear and de-
cide questions of federal law.94 This grant of authority, however, has 
long been understood to occur subject to state constitutional rules es-
tablishing the jurisdiction and powers of state courts. The U.S. Su-
preme Court has held, for instance, that state constitutions may es-
tablish standing rules broader than those permitted to federal courts 
under Article III and that state courts may hear federal law claims 
brought by parties who would lack standing to bring them in federal 
court.95 Indeed, the Court has gone further: it has held that its own 
jurisdiction may be expanded by standing rules established by state 
constitutions, thus permitting the Court to hear appeals of federal 
questions from state courts utilizing standing rules that would re-
quire dismissal if the same parties had brought the case up through 
the federal judicial system.96 
 The Supreme Court’s position in Bush I is all the more surprising 
because the text and context of Article II suggest a ready alternative 
construction that would be far more consistent with the practices dis-
cussed above. If a state’s constitution forbids its legislature to exer-
cise the power to select presidential electors in a way that comports 
with the requirements of Article II, the obvious remedy is to exclude 
the state’s electors from the presidential selection process—a power 
that Congress has already formalized by statute.97 There is simply no 
reason for the Court, particularly in light of the anti-commandeering 
principles it has articulated under the Commerce Clause,98 to con-
strue Article II as dictating directly the content and organization of 
state legislative power when a system of structural incentives could 
easily achieve the same goals by penalizing the inappropriate use of 
otherwise autonomous state power.99 Such a construction of Article II 
would give effect to the vital state constitutional regulatory function, 
while at the same time recognizing the requirement that national 
policy reign supreme in matters concerning national elections. 
                                                                                                                    
 94. See Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 342 (1816). 
 95. See ASARCO, Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 612-25 (1989). 
 96. Id. at 618-24. 
 97. 3 U.S.C. § 15 (1994). 
 98. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); New York v. United States, 505 
U.S. 144 (1992). 
 99. Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment furnishes an appealing model in these 
circumstances. That provision encourages states to grant the franchise as widely as possi-
ble, without requiring them to do so. States that disenfranchise males over the age of 
twenty-one are instead penalized by suffering a proportionate reduction in congressional 
representation. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2. 
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 This conclusion would be in no way inconsistent with some of the 
Court’s interpretations of other provisions of the U.S. Constitution 
that structure national political processes, most notably the Qualifi-
cations Clauses and the amendment procedures of Article V. In U.S. 
Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton100 the Court held that the list of quali-
fications for members of Congress set out in Article I of the U.S. Con-
stitution101 is not subject to alteration by state constitutional provi-
sions imposing additional or different qualifications on candidates 
running from the state in question. And in Hawke v. Smith,102 the 
Court invalidated a state constitutional provision requiring approval 
by popular referendum of state legislative ratifications of amend-
ments to the U.S. Constitution on the ground that Article V requires 
that ratification be performed by the state legislature itself.103 These 
cases, however, deal with provisions of the national Constitution that 
call upon American citizens to act exclusively in their capacity as 
citizens of the nation, in the former case by electing members of Con-
gress, and in the latter by deciding whether to amend the national 
Constitution. Article V makes use of the state legislative form for 
this purpose, but it is clear that the state legislature is functioning in 
this circumstance only as a convenient vehicle for the state-by-state 
aggregation of national opinion rather than as an agent of a distinct 
state polity.104 
 Not all national political processes, however, require Americans to 
act in their capacity as national citizens. As Madison noted, the U.S. 
Constitution is partly national and partly federal.105 In the former 
capacity, the Constitution creates political processes that are truly 
national and that treat citizens as a unified national polity. The 
Qualifications Clauses and Article V fall into this category. In its 
federal capacity, however, the Constitution builds some of its politi-
cal structures directly on the backs of state processes in which citi-
zens act not as a single, national citizenry but as disaggregated 
members of the various state polities.106 The preeminent example of 
                                                                                                                    
 100. 514 U.S. 779 (1995). 
 101. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2 (qualifications of Representatives); id. art. I, § 3, 
cl. 3 (qualifications of Senators). 
 102. 253 U.S. 221 (1920). 
 103. Id. at 229-31. 
 104. As the Court observed in Hawke, “ratification by a State of a constitutional 
amendment is not an act of legislation within the proper sense of the word.” Id. at 229. The 
same can be said of the original 1789 ratification of the Constitution by specially desig-
nated ratifying conventions. See U.S. CONST. art. VII; U.S. Term Limits, Inc., 514 U.S. at 
821-22; McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 402 (1819). 
 105. THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, supra note 63, at 253-57. 
 106. That, at least, is the theory. In practice, things have not turned out that way. To-
day, it seems to me, when Americans act in a disaggregated way—which they frequently 
do—the cleavages along which they divide bear no meaningful relation to state boundaries. 
In contrast, when they act pursuant to formal constitutional processes that contemplate 
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this is undoubtedly the U.S. Constitution’s treatment of the right to 
vote. As the U.S. Supreme Court has often pointed out, the Constitu-
tion grants no one the right to vote in national elections.107 Instead, it 
adopts by reference the voter qualifications established by the states: 
“the Electors in each State shall have the Qualifications requisite for 
Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State Legislature.”108 In 
this setting, state constitutional provisions establishing and regulat-
ing the right to vote clearly control and are simply made a part of the 
national constitutional scheme. State constitutional regulation of 
state voting qualifications is not somehow displaced in this situation 
merely because the U.S. Constitution sees fit to make use of existing 
state processes as a step toward accomplishing national political ob-
jectives. 
 A national constitutional structure even more directly on point is 
the pre-Seventeenth Amendment apparatus governing selection of 
United States Senators.109 Under the original scheme, U.S. Senators 
were elected by state legislatures: Article I, Section 3 of the U.S. 
Constitution expressly granted the power to conduct senatorial elec-
tions to “the Legislature” of each state. Moreover, Article I, Section 4 
expressly provides that “The Times, Places and Manner of holding 
Elections for Senator . . . shall be prescribed in each State by the Leg-
islature thereof . . . .”110 Thus, the power to conduct and regulate 
senatorial elections was allocated expressly, in two separate provi-
sions, to the state legislature specifically rather than the state gen-
erally just as it is in Article II.  
 Despite this doubly direct delegation of authority, no one appears 
to have assumed that state legislatures, in performing a vital na-
tional political function, somehow became immune in the perform-
ance of that function from the normal course of regulation by state 
constitutions. Indeed, the assumption appears to have been quite the 
opposite. Georgia’s 1798 Constitution, for example, the first it 
adopted following ratification of the national Constitution in 1789, 
imposed direct, albeit minimal, regulations on the legislative process 
for electing senators:  
                                                                                                                    
disaggregation along state lines, they act almost always in response to forces that are na-
tional in scope. See Gardner, supra note 90; Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back 
Into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 215 (2000). 
 107. Rodriguez v. Popular Democratic Party, 457 U.S. 1, 9 (1982) (quoting San Antonio 
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 n.78 (1973)); Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 
Wall.) 162, 178 (1875). 
 108. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1; see also id. amend. XVII, § 1 (same wording). 
 109. Id. art. I, § 3, cl. 1, amended by id. amend. XVII (1913). 
 110. Id. art. I, § 4 (emphasis added). Congress, however, is given the superseding 
power to regulate congressional elections. The full provision reads: “The Times, Places and 
Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each 
State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter 
such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing Senators.” Id. art. I, § 4, cl. 1. 
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 All elections by the general assembly shall be by joint ballot of 
both branches of the legislature; and when the senate and house of 
representatives unite for the purpose of electing, they shall meet in 
the representative chamber, and the president of the senate shall 
in such cases preside, receive the ballots, and declare the person or 
persons elected.111 
Vermont’s 1793 Constitution also contained a provision regulating 
elections for U.S. Senator:  
 All elections, whether by the people or the Legislature, shall be 
free and voluntary: and any elector who shall receive any gift or 
reward for his vote, in meat, drink, monies or otherwise, shall for-
feit his right to elect at that time, and suffer such other penalty as 
the law shall direct . . . .112 
Numerous other state constitutional provisions also imposed modest 
housekeeping requirements on legislative elections for U.S. Sena-
tor.113 Florida’s 1868 Constitution was even more direct: “The legisla-
ture shall elect United States Senators in the manner prescribed by 
the Congress of the United States and by this constitution.”114 
 Presidential elections possess this same federal, rather than na-
tional, character. The Constitution creates a system in which Presi-
dents are selected after a process of aggregating one by one the pref-
erences of individual state polities. The Framers did not believe that 
a single chief executive could be selected using a process continental 
in scope, if only because they believed no one could know the quali-
ties of good candidates from around an immense nation,115 and they 
did not try to construct such a system. Instead, they assumed that 
                                                                                                                    
 111. GA. CONST. art. IV, § 2 (1798). It is clear that this provision applies to elections, 
rather than ordinary legislative voting, because the provision goes on to state: “In all elec-
tions by the people the electors shall vote viva voce until the legislature shall otherwise di-
rect.” Id. 
 112. VT. CONST. ch. II, § 34 (1793) (emphasis added). 
 113. A fairly common type of regulation in early state constitutions provided: “In all 
elections by the general assembly, the members thereof shall vote viva voce, and the votes 
shall be entered on the journals.” E.g., ALA. CONST. art. VI, § 6 (1819). To similar effect 
were: ARK. CONST. art. IV, § 19 (1836); CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 38 (1849); FLA. CONST. art. 
VI, § 17 (1838); IND. CONST. art. II, § 13 (1851). 
 114. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 29 (1868). This provision was carried forward into the 1885 
constitution, FLA. CONST. art. III, § 31 (1885), which remained in force until ratification of 
the Seventeenth Amendment. 
 115. For example, at the 1787 convention, Elbridge Gerry argued that the people 
should play no role in presidential selection because they were “too little informed of per-
sonal characters in large districts . . . .” 3 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, supra note 78, at 
536 (statement of June 2). Roger Sherman similarly argued that the people “will never be 
sufficiently informed of characters . . . .” Id. at 537 (July 17). Colonel Mason also believed 
that “[t]he extent of the Country renders it impossible that the people can have the requi-
site capacity to judge of the respective pretensions of the Candidates.” Id. at 538 (July 17). 
But see id. at 537-38 (statement of Governour Morris, July 17): “[t]hey will not be unin-
formed of those great & illustrious characters which have merited their esteem & confi-
dence.” 
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presidential selection would be dominated by local knowledge and lo-
cal biases, which led them to require that the presidential and vice-
presidential candidates be from different states.116 Although national 
political parties have now extraconstitutionally coordinated the 
presidential selection process,117 the Constitution itself does not con-
template any fully national aspect to presidential selection. The elec-
tors from each state meet and deliberate only among themselves, for 
example, without deliberating with electors from other states.118 And, 
of course, if the Electoral College produces no majority winner, the 
selection process moves to the House of Representatives, where each 
state gets a single vote.119 
 In selecting presidential electors, then, or in providing for their se-
lection, state legislatures act not as agents of the national citizenry 
but as agents of the citizenry of their own states. In granting this au-
thority to state legislatures, the U.S. Constitution thus makes a 
grant of national power not to an agency of the nation but to an or-
gan of state government, functioning as an organ of state govern-
ment. When the national Constitution grants power in this particu-
lar way, it takes the organs of state government as it finds them—
subject to control by the state polity and acting under whatever in-
structions, embodied in the state constitution, that the state polity 
has seen fit to impose for the protection of its liberty.120 
 To take a relatively easy case, suppose, for example, that a state 
legislature were to use its Article II power to delegate the selection of 
presidential electors not to the people of the state but to some other 
organ of state government, such as the state supreme court. If state 
constitutional separation of powers principles prohibited state judges 
from exercising this function,121 Article II of the U.S. Constitution 
would not somehow override the state constitutional limitation on 
judicial authority. By the same token, it seems to me entirely within 
the reach of legitimate state constitutional power either to require 
the legislature to select presidential electors itself, or to forbid it from 
doing so and to require the legislature instead to provide for the se-
lection of electors by popular election. This is, perhaps, not so far 
                                                                                                                    
 116. See U.S. CONST. amend. XII. 
 117. See Kramer, supra note 106; see also E.E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, PARTY 
GOVERNMENT 1-12 (Dr. Phillips Bradley ed., 1942). 
 118. U.S. CONST. amend. XII. 
 119. Id. 
 120. This is the very position the Court took in Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355, 367-68 
(1932), where it rejected an argument that Article II forbids state laws regulating presi-
dential elections to be submitted to the governor for signature or veto pursuant to the 
state’s normal legislative processes established in its state constitution. 
 121. Cf. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989) (holding under U.S. Constitu-
tion that Article III judges may not be given duties incompatible with their judicial duties 
or that undermine the integrity of the judicial branch). 
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from the position the Florida Constitution takes when it directly au-
thorizes the state legislature to regulate elections, including presi-
dential elections, by law.122 
 Apparently, Congress understands these principles better than 
the Court does, for it has never claimed the power to regulate di-
rectly the process by which state legislatures select presidential elec-
tors, a power we might expect Congress to have if state legislatures, 
in choosing electors, were free from any controls originating at the 
state level.123 Instead, such regulations as Congress has enacted all 
deal with how electoral votes are canvassed and counted;124 they deal, 
that is to say, solely with the output of state legislative processes. 
Significantly, the only occasion on which Congress has intruded di-
rectly into the state legislative chamber to regulate state legislative 
processes is in a pre-Seventeenth Amendment statute establishing 
procedures for senatorial elections.125 However, Article I, Section 4 of 
                                                                                                                    
 122. See FLA. CONST. art. VI, § 1. 
 123. See Burroughs & Cannon v. United States, 290 U.S. 534 (1934), in which the 
Court rejected a challenge to the Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925 regulating contri-
butions by political committees. The defendants, charged with violating the Act, moved to 
dismiss their indictments on the ground that Congress lacked the power to regulate the 
way in which states select presidential electors, claiming that congressional power was 
limited by Article II, Section 1, Clause 4 to setting the date and time of voting for electors. 
The Court rejected this argument as taking too “narrow a view of the powers of Congress”: 
 The congressional act under review seeks to preserve the purity of presiden-
tial and vice-presidential elections. Neither in purpose nor in effect does it in-
terfere with the power of a state to appoint electors or the manner in which 
their appointment shall be made. It deals with political committees organized 
for the purpose of influencing elections in two or more states . . . . Its operation, 
therefore, is confined to situations which, if not beyond the power of the state to 
deal with at all, are beyond its power to deal with adequately. 
Id. at 544-45. While presidential electors are not officers or agents of the federal govern-
ment, they exercise federal functions under, and discharge duties by virtue of authority 
conferred by, the Constitution of the United States. The President is vested with the ex-
ecutive power of the nation. The importance of his election and the vital character of its re-
lationship to and effect upon the welfare and safety of the whole people cannot be too 
strongly stated. To say that Congress is without power to pass appropriate legislation to 
safeguard such an election from the improper use of money to influence the result is to 
deny to the nation in a vital particular the power of self protection. Congress, undoubtedly, 
possesses that power, as it possesses every other power essential to preserve the depart-
ments and institutions of the general government from impairment or destruction, 
whether threatened by force or by corruption. 
 124. See 3 U.S.C. §§ 1-18 (1994). 
 125. 14 Stat. 243, ch. 245, § 1 (1866).  
Each house [of the State Legislature] shall openly, by a viva voce of each mem-
ber present, name one person for senator in Congress from said State, and the 
name of the person so voted for, who shall have a majority of the whole number 
of votes cast in each house shall be entered on the journal of each house by the 
clerk or secretary thereof; but if either house shall fail to give such majority to 
any person on said day, that fact shall be entered on the journal. At twelve 
o’clock, meridian, of the day following . . . the members of the two houses shall 
convene in joint assembly and the journal of each house shall then be read, and 
if the same person shall have received a majority of all the votes in each house, 
such person shall be declared duly elected senator . . . ; but if the same person 
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the U.S. Constitution, unlike Article II, Section 1, grants this power 
expressly to Congress: “The Times, Places and Manner of holding 
Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in 
each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any 
time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places 
of chusing Senators.”126 Thus Congress, appropriately, has never in-
terpreted its own powers to include regulatory oversight of state leg-
islative selection of presidential electors. Conversely, state constitu-
tions, for their part, have never sought to regulate the processes by 
which national officers are certified and installed. 
 All parties except the Court, then, seem to have understood that 
there is a boundary dividing state and national authority in presi-
dential elections. This understanding makes the Court’s decision in 
Bush I all the more dangerous, for if Congress is correct that it lacks 
the power to regulate state legislative processes; and if the Court is 
prepared to cut off state legislatures engaged in selecting presiden-
tial electors from state constitutional oversight; then state legisla-
tures are subject to no legal constraints at all. The national system 
still would not be without recourse: Congress might still reject a 
state’s electoral votes if they have been somehow tainted. But it 
seems both unnecessary and unwise to place that protection solely in 
the hands of congressional political judgments when state constitu-
tions are available to do what they do best: restrain and control state 
legislative power by providing binding legal standards, judicially en-
forceable by independent state courts. 
IV.   DECENTRALIZATION OF STATE ELECTORAL ADMINISTRATION 
 Having embarked on the enterprise of displacing state internal 
structural decisions in Bush I, the Court proceeded to insert itself 
into another such decision in Bush II. Though somewhat better dis-
guised, the Court’s equal protection analysis in Bush II provides 
cover for an intrusive ruling that constitutionalizes the Court’s dis-
approval of Florida’s decision to decentralize the administration of 
presidential and other statewide elections. 
 As discussed earlier, the principal function of a state constitution 
is to determine how much power the state government will exercise 
and the ways in which it will be distributed. These decisions affect 
the liberty of the state citizenry in three ways. First, by allocating to 
                                                                                                                    
shall not have received a majority of the votes in each house, . . . the joint as-
sembly shall then proceed to choose, by a viva voce vote of each member pre-
sent a person for the purpose aforesaid, and the person having a majority of all 
the votes of the said joint assembly, a majority of all the members elected to 
both houses being present and voting, shall be declared duly elected . . . . 
Id. 
 126. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1 (emphasis added). 
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the state government a certain degree of affirmative power, the state 
polity determines the ability of the state government to use its pow-
ers directly to achieve the public good. Second, the decision deter-
mines how much power the state government will have at its dis-
posal to monitor and, if necessary, check abuses of national power by 
the federal government. Third, decisions concerning the internal 
structure of state power influence the degree to which state power 
may be deployed against itself. Pitting state power against itself in-
stitutionalizes a form of governmental self-restraint that reduces the 
threat to liberty created by granting the state government powers 
sufficient to achieve the first two objectives. To make these constitu-
tional decisions, a state polity must weigh its fears of state and na-
tional power, respectively, and balance those fears against the hopes 
and ambitions that caused it to create and empower a government in 
the first place. 
 A state polity that fears state power—and all do to some degree—
has at its disposal numerous methods for restraining that power. As 
we have seen, one such method involves dispersing state power. 
State power may be dispersed horizontally, of course, through the 
standard practice of separating power into three branches. Indeed, 
most states have gone beyond the national model of separation of 
powers and have dispersed power horizontally to an even greater de-
gree by subdividing the executive power and providing for the inde-
pendent election of sub-gubernatorial executive branch officials.127 
 Like national power, however, state power can also be dispersed 
vertically. The state level analogue to federalism involves the equally 
familiar distribution of power between state and local governments 
such as counties, towns, or cities. Exactly how much power a state 
polity chooses to withdraw from the centralized state government 
and allocate to decentralized local governments depends in part, as it 
does on the national level, on how much the polity is inclined to trust 
each level of government. In many states, local governments are 
granted little autonomous power. Municipal governments have often 
been regarded in the United States as administrative subdivisions of 
the states, “created as convenient agencies for exercising such of the 
governmental powers of the State as may be entrusted to them,”128 
and most state constitutions grant the state legislature plenary 
power to create or dissolve local governments and to delegate to them 
whatever powers it chooses. Dillon’s Rule, traditionally followed 
throughout the United States, holds additionally that the scope of 
                                                                                                                    
 127. New Jersey, which vests all executive power exclusively in its governor and elects 
no sub-gubernatorial officials (not even a lieutenant governor), is the prominent exception. 
See N.J. CONST. art. V. 
 128. Hunter v. Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178 (1907). 
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powers granted to local governments should be narrowly con-
strued.129 State governments that follow these practices thus may 
possess the power to decide which local governments will exist, if 
any; their precise configuration; the amount of power such govern-
ments will possess; and the circumstances in which that power may 
be used—all of which may be revoked or modified by the legislature 
at its pleasure. 
 From the point of view of vertical separation of powers, this ar-
rangement is functionally the equivalent of allowing Congress to de-
cide whether and how much authority state governments should ex-
ercise. It is not an arrangement, in other words, that can be expected 
to produce an effective check from below on abuses of state power. To 
allocate state power in this way is to grant power to state govern-
ments in a far more concentrated form than the form in which simi-
lar powers are allocated to the national government. Yet power con-
centrated, as Madison warned, is far more dangerous than power 
dispersed. That a state polity chooses nevertheless to forgo a vertical 
check and grant power to the state government in this concentrated 
form suggests a degree of popular confidence in state government 
that has no counterpart on the national level. 
 Not every state follows this approach, however. In some states, lo-
cal governments are granted often considerable power through con-
stitutional home rule provisions—provisions that place these local 
powers beyond the authority of state legislatures to invade or dis-
place.130 In these states, popular trust in local government may be far 
greater, at least with respect to the purposes enumerated in home 
rule provisions. 
 Florida, it seems, has chosen a middle approach toward its local 
governments. The Florida Constitution strikes the balance between 
state and local power generally in favor of the state, but it sets aside 
a few areas in which power is given unequivocally to local govern-
ments. Municipalities, for example, have presumptive independence 
under the Florida Constitution, which provides that “[m]unicipalities 
shall have governmental, corporate and proprietary powers to enable 
them to conduct municipal government, perform municipal functions 
and render municipal services, and may exercise any power for mu-
nicipal purposes except as otherwise provided by law.”131 Yet nothing 
in this provision requires any municipalities to exist at all, and even 
                                                                                                                    
 129. See Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I—The Structure of Local Government 
Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 8 (1990). 
 130. See 1 CHESTER JAMES ANTIEAU & JOHN MICHAEL ANTIEAU, ANTIEAU’S LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT LAW § 3.14 (1996). 
 131. FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 2(b). 
654  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:625 
 
existing municipalities, though granted potentially broad powers,132 
may see those powers revoked or altered at the pleasure of the legis-
lature. 
 Things stand differently in Florida regarding counties. The Flor-
ida Constitution expressly requires that “[t]he state shall be divided 
by law into political subdivisions called counties.”133 It then proceeds 
to grant expressly to counties the exclusive power to conduct all 
statewide and county elections.134 Under the Florida scheme, then, 
the state itself has been stripped of the power to administer elections 
not only of officials of local governments, but of its own officials. This 
is about as clear an indication as one can expect to find that the citi-
zens of Florida do not trust state officials with the administration of 
elections, or at least do not trust them to perform this function as 
much as they trust their local officials to do so. 
 It is not entirely clear what particular considerations or historical 
experiences caused the people of Florida to allocate power in this 
way, but it is easy to imagine why a polity might think such an ar-
rangement more conducive to its liberty than a centrally adminis-
tered state electoral system. First, a decentralized electoral system is 
more difficult to bring under the control of a single person, group, or 
party. Second, unlike state election officials, local election officials 
are ready at hand, visible, well known in their communities, and ac-
countable to the local populace. Third, allowing state officials direct 
control over the very electoral system that could keep them in power 
might provide them with the means and the temptation to manipu-
late the system so as to secure their perpetuation in office. Whatever 
the reason, Floridians have made a decision about how best to pro-
tect their liberty from invasions at the hands of their own state gov-
ernment, a decision that was theirs to make and is not subject to re-
view under any principle of national constitutional law. 
 Or at least that was the case prior to Bush II. In my view, the 
Court’s equal protection ruling in Bush II represents an attack on 
Floridians’ decision to protect their liberty by constitutionally decen-
tralizing the administration of statewide elections. The Court’s rul-
ing reacts to this entirely legitimate, internal, vertical separation of 
state powers by applying to Florida’s system, under cover of the 
                                                                                                                    
 132. See State v. Panama City Beach, 529 So. 2d 250 (Fla. 1988); TALBOT 
D’ALEMBERTE, THE FLORIDA STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE 124-25 (G. Alan 
Tarr ed., 1991). 
 133. FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(a). 
 134. Id. art. VI, § 5(a) (“A general election shall be held in each county on the first 
Tuesday after the first Monday in November of each even-numbered year to choose a suc-
cessor to each elective state and county officer whose term will expire before the next gen-
eral election . . . . ”). 
2001]                          REGULATORY ROLE 655 
 
Equal Protection Clause, what amounts to a federal nondelegation 
doctrine for states. 
 My conclusion rests to a great extent on the facial implausibility 
of the Court’s equal protection analysis, which I shall briefly re-
hearse. To begin with, there is no suggestion in Bush II that inten-
tional discrimination played any role in the structuring of Florida’s 
vote-counting processes.135 This in itself is not fatal, however, since 
intentional discrimination has never been required in cases falling 
within the fundamental rights strand of equal protection analysis.136 
What has always been required in every equal protection case, how-
ever, is the identification of some class of persons disadvantaged by 
the challenged government action. Neither the parties nor the Court 
ever identified such a class, and indeed they could not do so. No class 
of voters within any county could have been systematically disadvan-
taged by that county’s choice of vote-counting method, since the bal-
lots of all voters within the county were counted by the same means. 
The essence of Bush’s constitutional claim, moreover, was that the 
counting and invalidation of ballots fell essentially randomly, and 
was thus unconstitutionally arbitrary,137 a premise inconsistent with 
the existence of an identifiable disadvantaged class. 
 The only plausible candidate for a disadvantaged class might con-
sist of the class of all voters for statewide candidates who resided in 
counties that utilized the less-reliable methods of vote counting. 
Residents of these counties were at a disadvantage compared to resi-
dents of counties that used more reliable methods of vote counting 
because their ballots were disqualified at a higher rate, thus dispro-
portionately diminishing the voices of such voters in determining the 
outcome of statewide races. The Court did not speak in these terms, 
but even if it had, such a claim contains a fatal flaw. When the peo-
ple of a Florida county, through their elected representatives, adopt a 
substandard method of counting votes, the wound is self-inflicted, 
through ordinary processes of collective self-governance. It is, in 
other words, nothing more than an ordinary instance of interjurisdic-
tional variation in the law, a commonplace phenomenon that has 
never been thought to raise equal protection concerns.138 
                                                                                                                    
 135. Allegations were later made, in other forums, of intentional discrimination 
against minority voters. See Dana Canedy, Rights Panel Begins Inquiry Into Florida’s Vot-
ing System, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2001, at A20. Even so, I do not believe that anyone has 
gone so far as to accuse the state of deliberately utilizing a system of punch-card balloting 
in heavily minority districts for the purpose of reducing the number of countable votes 
from those districts. 
 136. See Ira C. Lupu, Untangling the Strands of the Fourteenth Amendment, 77 MICH. 
L. REV. 981 (1979). 
 137. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 105-06 (2000). 
 138. See Gerald L. Neuman, Territorial Discrimination, Equal Protection, and Self-
Determination, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 261 (1987). 
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 Having before it no cognizable class of systematically disadvan-
taged voters, the Court resorts to different language, the language of 
arbitrary deprivation of the right to vote. “[T]he State,” says the 
Court, “may not, by . . . arbitrary and disparate treatment, value one 
person’s vote over that of another.”139 However, the right to be free 
from arbitrary deprivations of constitutionally protected interests is 
one that sounds in due process, not equal protection. The Court at-
tempts nevertheless to shoehorn the problem into equal protection 
terms, by citing Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections140 and Rey-
nolds v. Sims141 to support its analysis. Neither of these cases helps, 
unfortunately, because both involved disadvantageous treatment of 
identifiable classes of voters: those who could not afford a poll tax in 
the former case, and those who lived in populous urban districts in 
the latter. Here, there is no such identifiable class. 
 The Court’s insistence on an equal protection analysis grows more 
puzzling as the opinion unfolds. Florida’s recount mechanisms, the 
Court asserts, “do not satisfy the minimum requirement for non-
arbitrary treatment of voters . . . .”142 This was so, the Court explains, 
because the “intent of the voter” standard to be applied under Florida 
law contains an “absence of specific standards to ensure its equal ap-
plication.”143 It is, in other words, too vague. This vagueness then 
causes the arbitrary treatment of voters, according to the Court. Yet 
both of these related problems—arbitrariness and vagueness—have 
historically been treated by the Court as raising questions of due 
process, not equal protection. Both deal with the direct relationship 
of the law to individuals, not the relative position under the law of 
one individual compared to another. The right to nonarbitrary 
treatment under the law is, after all, the essence of due process ra-
tionality review.144 When arbitrary treatment results from a law’s 
vagueness, the problem has always been treated as one of due proc-
ess.145 
 But even if the problem the Court identifies is couched more ap-
propriately as one of due process vagueness, the claim still contains 
fatal flaws. Under the Due Process Clause, vagueness in a law raises 
                                                                                                                    
 139. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 104-05. 
 140. 383 U.S. 663 (1966). 
 141. 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
 142. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 105. 
 143. Id. at 105-06. 
 144. See Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955). 
 145. Vagueness, under the Due Process Clause, becomes a problem when a law is so 
vague that persons “of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and dif-
fer as to its application . . . .” Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926). There 
is another, more specialized vagueness doctrine that arises under the First Amendment to 
combat statutory vagueness which chills speech, Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 
(1972), but that doctrine is inapplicable here. 
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constitutional problems only when the law is so vague that individu-
als become unable to understand it and thus to conform their conduct 
to the law.146 That is why legislative vagueness most often rises to 
the level of a due process problem in the criminal setting. The 
vagueness here is very different: the recount law requiring applica-
tion of the intent-of-the-voter standard is addressed not to individu-
als, but to government officials. There is no claim in Bush II that vot-
ing instructions provided to individual voters were too vague. Rather, 
the claim is that Florida law provides county election officials with 
insufficient guidance as to the proper method of counting ballots, al-
lowing such officials to exercise inappropriately unconstrained dis-
cretion, which in turn “has led to unequal evaluation of                  
ballots . . . .”147 “[E]ach of the counties,” the Court complains, “used 
varying standards to determine what was a legal vote. Broward 
County used a more forgiving standard than Palm Beach County, 
and uncovered almost three times as many new votes . . . .”148 
 There is a constitutional doctrine that covers situations where le-
gal rules meant to guide government officials instead vest them with 
excessive discretion, but it is a doctrine neither of equal protection 
nor due process. It is the nondelegation doctrine. The nondelegation 
doctrine prohibits legislatures from delegating power to executive 
branch officials in terms so vague as to give them essentially no leg-
islative guidance.149 That is precisely the problem here. The defect in 
Florida’s election procedure, according to the Court, is the lack of 
“adequate statewide standards for determining what is a legal      
vote . . . .”150 
 Had this election been conducted by national administrative offi-
cials under laws enacted by Congress, the Court might have some 
business deciding that the intent-of-the-voter standard gave those of-
ficials a degree of discretion so great as to violate the nondelegation 
doctrine, and thus violated the constitutionally mandated separation 
of powers. Obviously, however, the U.S. Supreme Court had no busi-
ness holding that the State of Florida violated any kind of separation 
of powers doctrine. The internal structure of Florida government, in-
cluding its vertical separation of powers, is for the state’s citizenry to 
decide. Moreover, as shown earlier, states have exercised this free-
dom by choosing a wide variety of structures that allocate govern-
                                                                                                                    
 146. See, e.g., City of Chi. v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999); Papachristou v. City of Jack-
sonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972). 
 147. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 106. 
 148. Id. at 107. 
 149. See Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. 
United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 
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 150. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 110. 
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ment authority in different ways and which separate the allocated 
powers with different degrees of strictness. In fact, the strength of 
nondelegation principles is an area in which state constitutional 
practices differ widely, not only from one state constitution to an-
other but as between the state and national constitutions.151 
 The Court took pains to disclaim any intention of interfering with 
state discretion in this area: “The question before the Court is not 
whether local entities, in the exercise of their expertise, may develop 
different systems for implementing elections.”152 Yet that is pretty 
much what the Court has done. By basing its ruling, albeit indirectly, 
on its objection to Florida’s decentralization of election administra-
tion, the Court has interfered with, and for all practical purposes in-
validated, a measure crafted by the state polity for the better protec-
tion of its liberty. Such a ruling fails to pay adequate respect to the 
national constitutional structure of federalism, a structure that al-
lows state polities alone to decide how best to balance state power 
against national and local power. 
CONCLUSION 
 The Court’s decisions in Bush I and Bush II may be criticized on 
many grounds, as the papers in this symposium reveal. But one of 
the worst aspects of the opinions is the way they invade state auton-
omy over internal structures of state self-governance. The Court’s de-
cisions conflict with basic principles of federalism, which envision a 
shared, federal process of presidential selection in which state and 
national power each play distinct roles. The Bush cases transform 
the governance of presidential elections from a shared enterprise of 
the national and state legislative and judicial branches to one con-
ducted exclusively by national actors. The result is a centralization of 
power in the national government—and particularly in the national 
judiciary—considerably at odds with the purposes and methods of 
federalism. 
 In other recent contexts, the U.S. Supreme Court has taken great 
pains to assert the importance of federalism to the protection of indi-
vidual liberty. It has gone so far as to curb severely some major 
pieces of national civil rights legislation on the ground that they may 
not be enforced against the states without their consent153—on the 
ground, that is to say, that the direct protection of individual liberty 
through specifically targeted legislation must take a backseat to the 
indirect protection of individual liberty through structural federal-
                                                                                                                    
 151. See Rossi, supra note 67, at 1191-1201. 
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ism. It is difficult, to say the least, to square the Court’s rulings in 
the Bush cases with this position. 
